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Abstract — Randomness of fast fading multipath channels has 
been used for encryption keys generation for a long time. It is 
believed that until an adversary is able to intercept all partial 
waves detected by legal users, generated keys are secure. In many 
cases, however, only one or two dominant waves may define the 
channel fading and generated key. In this work, we examine a 
possibility of creating a partial key highly-related to the legal key 
using information about only a few dominant partial waves. 
Based on simulation of multipath radio propagation, correlation 
of partial phase formed only by dominant waves and total phase 
of multipath signal is assessed for various contributions of the 
dominating component. A key interception probability is 
estimated for Multipath Key Generation systems exploiting 
randomness of carrier phase. An influence of the line-of-sight 
component and number of multipaths on the correlation of 
partial and total phases is considered. It is shown that a serious 
threat to security of the generated key exists only if the 
dominating component holds at least a 95%-share of the signal 
power, which is unlikely in practice. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Multipath Key Generation (MKG) exploits 
randomness of fast fading multipath channel to create identical 
copies of a shared encryption key at two nodes A and B [1]. 
Both nodes should exchange a series of probing signals. While 
propagating through a multipath environment, the signals are 
randomly modulated by the fast fading. By further 
demodulation of the received signal, the nodes generate two 
random bit strings keyA and keyB. These strings are identical 
(keyA = keyB) due to the channel reciprocity and not known to 
anyone, except for the nodes A and B, which allows their use as 
a secret encryption key. Such scenario is natural for urban 
environment, which allows its implementation in cellular 
communications for secure distribution of secret keys between 
base transceiver stations and user mobile phones. 
Various signal parameters are used for the key generation 
purposes. However, one of the most secure are phase methods 
[2][3]. Being both periodical and ambiguous, carrier phase 
cannot be intercepted reliably at distances greater than λ/2 from 
a legal node. Thus, security of the generated key relies on a 
rapid spatial decorrelation of the carrier phase. From a physical 
point of view, it means that an adversary is unable to eavesdrop 
to all partial waves detected by user. When analyzing wireless 
communications in urban environment, it is common to refer to 
the Rayleigh channel model that assumes equal power of all 
partial waves. A more general model based on the Nakagami-m 
distribution permits a presence of a few dominant waves in the 
received signal [4]. Such waves may define almost completely 
dynamics of the channel fading along with the generated key. 
Therefore, if the adversary focused his efforts on intercepting 
the dominant waves (or simply D-waves, for shortness), it 
would be a serious threat to security of the key. 
Another malicious threat is the external modulation attack 
that completely compromises all amplitude-based MKG-
systems [5][6]. In this attack, a set of high-power transmitters 
is arranged around the legal nodes to imitate a natural channel 
fading by modulated radio emissions. In essence, each 
malicious transmitter creates its own D-wave. Due to use of 
modulated phase samples, legal nodes create an unsecure key 
that follows the modulation law defined by the adversary. 
The purpose of this work is to examine a possibility of 
creating a partial key highly-related to the legal key using 
information about only a few D-waves. We perform numerical 
estimates of correlation of partial phase formed only by a few 
D-waves and total phase formed by all multipaths for various 
contributions of the dominating component. By binary 
quantization of samples of total and partial phases, the legal 
and partial keys are created to assess a key interception 
probability. The estimates are done both for LOS and NLOS 
scenarios with typical (12-tap) and low (3-tap) number of 
multipaths.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section II presents 
scenario model. Channel simulation is described in Section III. 
Correlation estimates of partial and total phases are given in 
Section IV. Section V gives estimates of the key interception 
probability. Conclusion summarizes our principal results. 
II. SCENARIO MODEL 
In this section, we present a mathematical model of the 
multipath signal containing two D-waves and describe 
scenarios of both passive and active attack on the system. 
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